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RESOURCE ALLOCATION AS AN OUTCROPPING
OF STRATEGIC CONSISTENCY:
PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
JEFFREY S. HARRISON
University of Central Florida
ERNEST H. HALL, JR.
University of Southern Indiana
RAJENDRA NARGUNDKAR
Vignana Jyothi Institute of Management
Similarities in financial resource allocations across the lines of busi-

ness of diversified firms may indicate corporate strategic consistency,
which may lead to superior corporate performance. In support of this
argument, the variance in R&D intensity across the lines of business of
96 diversified firms was found to be inversely related to industryadjusted return on assets. However, no relationship was found for capital intensity. These results provide partial support for the usefulness of
a resource-based approach to the study of diversification strategy.

The increase in the diversification of business organizations in th
United States and elsewhere over the past several decades has been acc
panied by an increase in research on the topic. Hoskisson and Hitt (1
included 254 citations in their review of the diversification literature
Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). Although much of this research has

tered on the relationship between diversification and financial performan

contradictory findings have made it difficult for researchers to agre

which of many alternative theories best represents this critical relations

(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). Of particular concern is the role of relatedn

among a firm's diversified businesses in producing synergy and thus hig
performance.
The purpose of this article is to present theory and empirical evidenc
that support a resource-based view of the relationship between diversific

tion and performance (Barney, 1988; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Irel
1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). The resource-base
view, which focuses on the management of firm resources to produc
sustainable competitive advantage, is in harmony with some of the tr

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Department of Management at Clem
University, where most of this research was conducted. We would also like to thank Mi
Stahl, Caron St. John, Stephen Cantrell, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal;
advice greatly enhanced the quality of this project and the final article.
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tional diversification literature. However, it also provides unique perspectives on the relatedness-performance relationship. We developed these perspectives and tested some resulting hypotheses. In particular, our hypotheses concern the performance effects of resource allocation similarities among
the lines of business of large, diversified firms over a seven-year period.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The traditional product-market approach to conceptualizing

suring diversification has limitations. We offer an alternative appr
ming from the resource-based view of firms.

Traditional Perspectives on Diversification

Many management scholars believe that relatedness among the
business of diversified firms results in higher performance (e.g., B
Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Capon, Hulbert, Farley, & Martin, 1988; Da

inson, Pearce, & Park, 1992; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; Rumelt,

Shelton, 1988; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987; Wernerfelt & Mon

1986). However, researchers have reported both results that su
idea and results that do not (e.g., Amit & Livnat, 1988; Bettis &
Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987; Grant & Jammine, 1988; Grant, Ja
Thomas, 1988; Michel & Shaked, 1984; Palepu, 1985). These dis
are sometimes traceable to the influence of differing perspectives
odologies (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 1979; Venkatra
A closer examination of widely used measures of relatedness and s
theoretical explanations will help bring these issues to light.
Most empirical studies of the relatedness construct have m
output-based measures that rely on product, market, or technolog
larities within a diversified firm's business portfolio (e.g., Capon
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Nathanson & Cassano, 1982; P
Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Shelton, 1988; Simmonds, 1990; Varadara
manujam, 1987). For example, in one of the most frequently ci
Rumelt defined lines of business as related if they were "tangibly
the collective skills and strengths possessed originally by the f
11). He observed three types of relatedness: "(1) relationships a
kets served and distribution systems; (2) relationships based on sim
duction technologies; or (3) the exploitation of science-based
(Rumelt, 1974: 17).
In another widely cited study, Palepu (1985) employed the J
and Berry (1979) entropy measure, which is based on the Standard
Classification (SIC) system created by the United States Departmen
merce. SIC codes are based on traditional industry groupings i
economy. For example, the two-digit "major group 33" is used
businesses that are engaged in primary metal industries. The majo
then divided into three-digit groups such as blast furnaces (33
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steel foundries (332), and primary metal industries (333). These groups are
then divided into more specific four-digit industries such as copper (3331)
and lead (3332). According to Jacquemin and Berry (1979), businesses are
related if they are involved in different four-digit industries within the same
major two-digit group.

In theory, similarities among products, markets, or technologies, as

identified with measures such as those described above, should lead to
synergies, often through economies of scope (Panzer & Willig, 1981; Rumelt,

1982; Teece, 1980). Synergies can arise from tangible similarities among

businesses that allow the combining of physical processes, such as use of the
same marketing channels for several related products or use of excess production capacity to produce an additional product. Synergies may also arise

from intangible resource commonalities that result in an ability to share
management expertise or know-how across several related business seg-

ments (Porter, 1985, 1987).

Although output-based approaches to the measurement of relatedness
are often considered valid indicators for the potential for resource-based
synergies, these synergies may never be realized (Nayyar, 1992), which may
partially explain the contradictions noted earlier. One reason for this loss of
potential could be that some related diversification strategies are well for-

mulated but inappropriately implemented. For example, Hill, Hitt, and
Hoskisson (1992) discovered that high performance in related-diversified

firms is partially dependent on high centralization of control, high integration of activities, use of both subjective and objective criteria in evaluating
divisional performance, and incentive schemes that are linked to the profitability of an entire corporation.
Another reason companies may not realize synergies is that the potential for synergies based on intangible resources relies on assumptions that

business units producing similar products or marketing goods to similar
customers use similar management techniques or share a strategic focus.
These assumptions may not always be valid. For example, it is possible for
two companies to produce the same product but have very different perspectives on the usefulness of research and development in the way it is
produced (Porter, 1985). In addition, the same two companies may have
dissimilar capital structures, with one company favoring human labor and
customization while the other emphasizes a more highly automated produc-

tion process and standardization. This type of diversity is common in in-

dustries such as steel and automobiles.

A resource-based view of diversification can overcome some of the lim-

itations associated with traditional product- or market-based diversification
theory and research (Harrison et al., 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). From a resource-based perspective, the management of firm
resources is closely linked to both strategy formulation and strategy implementation, but the use of traditional measures encourages a focus on strategy
formulation only. In addition, similar levels of investment in resources such
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as R&D and capital across the lines of business of a diversified firm could be

a sign of consistency in dominant logic, distinctive competency, or other
organizational factors.

A Resource-based Perspective on Diversification
From a resource-based view, business executives should manage diversified resources so as to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), which should lead to short- and long-term economic profits
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Barney classified firm resources into three
types: physical (Williamson, 1975), human (Becker, 1964), and organizational (Tomer, 1987). Most closely related to the present study's concerns are (1)
human resources, organizational elements such as the training, experience,
judgment, intelligence, and insight of a firm's managers, and (2) organiza-

tional resources, which include the firm's formal and informal planning,
controlling, and coordinating systems and its formal reporting structure.

According to Mahoney and Pandian, unique capabilities arising from
technical know-how and managerial ability "are important sources of heterogeneity that may result in sustained competitive advantage" (1992: 365).
Distinctive competence and superior organizational routines may enable a
firm to generate profits (e.g., economic rents) from a resource advantage
(Hitt & Ireland, 1985; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Citing Penrose (1959),
Mahoney and Pandian continued, "A firm may achieve rents not because it
has better resources, but rather the firm's distinctive competence involves
making better use of its resources" (1992: 365)."
Harrison and colleagues (1991) recently investigated the issue of whether resource allocation similarities or differences between acquiring firms and
their targets are associated with better management of combined resources in
post-merger periods. Specifically, they compared acquiring and target firm

premerger expenditure levels in key strategic areas such as R&D. Surprisingly, they discovered that differences, not similarities, in expenditure levels were associated with higher financial performance. They explained that
their findings were primarily a result of the competitive bidding process for
acquisitions, which tends to result in acquiring firms' paying higher premiums when they are strategically similar to their targets (Barney, 1986, 1988).
Although the bidding process argument applies well to acquisitions, it

is not compelling in the case of a firm with an established portfolio of
businesses. One reason for the discrepancy is that a lot of diversification
occurs through internal development (Porter, 1987), where the external bid-

ding process does not apply. Also, even in the case of acquisitions, the

short-term effects and high costs, such as premiums, attorney and advise-

ment fees, and transaction costs, are likely to be dissipated over the long
term, especially as the operations of the acquired firm are integrated into its
parent.

Harrison and colleagues (1991) also explained that acquiring firms may
have the opportunity to satisfy unmet needs in their existing business portfolios through acquisitions. Citing the example of a food processor acquiring
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a food packager, they stated that the complementarity of these two businesses could lead to synergy. However, both those authors and Stewart,
Harris, and Carleton (1984) discovered that firms tended to acquire targets
with resource allocation similarities, not dissimilarities (cf. MacDonald,

1985; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991). Therefore, we concluded that the
performance effects Harrison and colleagues found were due primarily to the
bidding process and not resource complementarity.

In summary, we contend that resource similarities, not differences,

among the lines of business of diversified firms are likely to lead to higher

performance. In a sense, this idea conflicts with classic portfolio theory,

which advocates that a firm's businesses be positioned at different stages of
the product life cycle, a pattern that implies varying demands for capital and
R&D. In other words, a strategy that makes sense from a cash flow perspective may not lead to effective management of resources.

Dominant Logic and Resource Allocations
Mahoney and Pandian contended that "a rich connection among the
firm's resources, distinctive competencies and mental models or 'dominant
logic' ... of the managerial team drives the diversification process" (1992:
365). A firm's dominant logic consists of a knowledge structure and a set of
management processes that are acquired through the experiences of managers during their careers (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Furthermore, these experiences are influenced by the dominant business of a firm, which Prahalad
and Bettis called the core business. As those authors explained: "The characteristics of the core business, often the source of top managers in diversified firms, tend to cause managers to define problems in certain ways and
develop familiarity with and facility in the use of those administrative tools
that are particularly useful in accomplishing the critical tasks of the core
business" (1986: 491). According to Prahalad and Bettis, managers consider
few organizational events as being totally unique or requiring detailed analysis. Instead, they process events through preexisting knowledge systems
known as schemata (Norman, 1976). Schemata represent beliefs, theories,
and propositions that are developed over time through participation in certain firms and businesses. Therefore, managers of different firms within
strategically similar businesses or industries may have similar schemata as a
result of their personal experiences in those businesses.
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) reasoned that differences in the strategic
characteristics of the businesses in a firm's portfolio can influence the ability
of top managers to successfully manage the firm. In other words, managers

may learn to be successful in the core business or in businesses that are

strategically similar to the core business but may not have the skills necessary to be successful in businesses with different strategic characteristics.
Also, Grant explained that the effectiveness with which corporate managers
of diversified firms allocate resources among businesses and guide and coordinate business unit strategies "is determined, in part, by the ability of top
management to apply similar knowledge and systems to the different busi-
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nesses within the firm (1988: 640). Relatedness based on a common dominant logic may transcend traditional relatedness boundaries based on products, markets, or technologies.
One possible extension of these arguments is that businesses that allo-

cate strategic resources in similar ways are more likely to share a similar
dominant logic than those that do not. Prahalad and Bettis recognized the

link between dominant logic and resource allocations in stating that "a dom-

inant general management logic is defined as the way in which managers
conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions"
(1986: 490).

These concepts will now be developed around two strategic resource
variables, R&D and capital expenditures, both of which have been found to
be important in strategic management research (Baysinger & Hoskisson,
1989; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Franko, 1989; Fryxell, 1990; Harrison
et al., 1991; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991).
R&D Resource Allocations as a Source of Strategic Information
Resource allocations across business units can be a source of strategic
information. In particular, similarity in R&D resource allocations across
lines of business can signal two strategically relevant phenomena: firm involvement in industries having similar requirements for R&D because they
are in the same stage in the business life cycle, or an attempt on the part of
corporate executives to manage lines of business similarly. According to the
theory of dominant logic developed earlier, these two phenomena are insep-

arably intertwined; that is, the dominant logic developed in a firm's core
business is likely to influence both its selection of businesses in which to
compete (Harrison et al., 1991; Stewart et al., 1984) and the way businesses
are managed (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).
A consistent pattern of high R&D intensity across lines of business,
regardless of the reason for it, is likely to make skill and knowledge transference through executive transfers, promotions, and other means easier and
more effective. But if one business does not share the corporate emphasis on
R&D, it likewise may not fit the dominant logic of the corporation. We would
expect such a lack of fit to reduce the ability of corporate managers to understand the outlier business unit and the conditions necessary for its success. The effectiveness of skill and knowledge transference through executive transfers and promotions may also be reduced.

Alternatively, a corporation with a dominant logic that places a low
emphasis on R&D activities can experience similar difficulties in managing
a line of business that requires large allocations to R&D to remain competitive. In this case, corporate executives are unlikely to appreciate the competitive conditions of the outlier business unit. Likewise, a manager who is

transferred from a core unit of the firm to the outlier may not have the skills

necessary to make it a success.
Independent of the dominant logic arguments is the following: a firm
that encourages large allocations to R&D across all its businesses may also be
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trying to develop a distinctive corporate competence in research (Hitt &
Ireland, 1985, 1986). Stalk, Evans, and Shulman (1992) referred to distinctive corporate competencies as core capabilities, business processes that are
critical to success across multiple units (and multiple stages of the value
chain) within an organization. Because core capabilities are "everywhere
and nowhere" (Stalk et al., 1992: 62), no one executive or business unit
controls them.

The corporate emphasis in an organization that is developing a core
capability is not on products and markets, but on improving particular business processes to such an extent that they lead to a sustainable competitive

advantage (Stalk et al., 1992). Hitt and Ireland (1986) argued that even in

firms that are classified as unrelated-diversified using traditional relatedness

criteria, there may be some common distinctive competencies that can be
applied across businesses that will promote higher overall performance in
the corporation. Therefore, similar R&D resource allocations to different
lines of business may be associated with an attempt to develop a distinctive
competence or core capability in this area.
On the other hand, varying levels of R&D expenditures across lines of
business may be associated with totally different business-level strategies.
Scarpello, Boulton, and Hofer (1986) suggested that new product leadership
first requires a wide range and high level of R&D commitments, then process
development, and finally, product development. However, an imitator strategy requires very little or no R&D.

High or low levels of R&D expenditures may also be associated with
other organizational factors. For example, highly research-intensive firms
employ many highly trained professionals and specialists. Professional employees desire freedom from bureaucratic rules and authority (Podsakoff,
Williams, & Todor, 1986). Because of the high levels of training and the rapid
product and process changes associated with high levels of R&D, an organic
organizational system is probably appropriate in these types of firms (Burns
& Stalker, 1961). But firms that place less emphasis on R&D are likely to have
workers with less training, as well as slower product and process change;
thus, these firms are likely to be more mechanistic.
Inconsistent organizational systems-for example, a mix of organic and
mechanistic systems-among lines of business that are or are not researchintensive can make skill transference and proper management difficult.
Clashing systems can also make physical resource sharing among business
units very difficult, thus reducing the probability of identifying and exploit-

ing synergies based on existing tangible resource commonalities.
Organizational culture is another influence closely related to the organic-mechanistic dimension. It is likely that the culture of a highly R&D
intensive firm will develop differently from the culture of a firm that places

little emphasis on R&D. Willingness to assume risk, desire for autonomy,
and decision making are among the cultural factors that are likely to be

affected, with high R&D firms favoring more risk taking and decentralized
decision making. Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber (1992) discov-
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ered that cultural differences between acquiring firms and their targets were

associated with low levels of shareholder return when culture was measured

as, among other things, attitude towards risk, autonomy, and decision making.

In summary, firms should diversify in directions that are consistent
with their overall corporate emphases on R&D. The arguments contained
herein should also extend to corporate performance. Resource allocation
similarities among lines of business should lead to more successful transference of skills, knowledge, and experience and greater understanding of a

firm's various lines of business by corporate managers. These advantages
should lead to higher performance in diversified firms. Stated differently,
low variance in R&D intensity across lines of business should lead to higher
performance.

Hypothesis 1: Variance in R&D intensity across the lines
of business of diversified firms will be inversely related to
corporate financial performance.

Some of these arguments also apply to allocations of capital across the

lines of business of diversified firms.

Capital Intensity and the Center of Gravity

Harrison and colleagues (1991) discovered that capital-intensive firms
sought out other capital-intensive firms as acquisition targets (cf. Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991). However, the effect, although significant in a corre-

lational analysis (r = .32, p < .01), was not as strong as it was for R&D
intensity (r = .64). Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) developed a model that
is helpful in understanding why businesses with similar capital require-

ments may also display other strategic similarities.

The model developed by Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986) is based on the
stages of the manufacturing supply chain, which is similar to the value-

added industry supply chain found in economics. The upstream supply flow
moves from raw materials extraction through primary manufacturing to fab-

rication. The downstream stages include final product manufacturing, distribution, and retail sale. According to Galbraith and Kazanjian, a company
establishes its "center of gravity" by beginning its operations at a particular
stage of the supply chain in an industry. Once a company is successful (if it
is successful) in mastering the management techniques and processes that
are necessary at that stage, strategic changes take place through moves
around and from this center of gravity.
Firms that have similar centers of gravity are expected to have similar

strategic characteristics (Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986). For example, firms
that engage in raw materials extraction and primary manufacturing (upstream companies) are expected to be much more capital-intensive than
companies that produce and market finished goods (downstream companies). The capital-intensive upstream companies are characterized by an
emphasis on commodity products, standardization, maximization of the
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number of end users of products, low-cost production, line-driven organization structures, process innovation, high emphasis on a capital budget, high

levels of technological know-how, and a functional emphasis on manufac-

turing and engineering. Alternatively, the market-oriented downstream companies are characterized by proprietary products, customization, target marketing, high margins, line and staff-driven structures, product innovation,
high emphasis on an advertising budget, high levels of marketing skills, and

a functional emphasis on product development and marketing (Galbraith &
Kazanjian, 1986).
Consequently, similar capital requirements among lines of business may

indicate a narrow dispersion around the center of gravity, which should

facilitate effective management and skill and knowledge transference. How-

ever, even if lines of business with similar capital resource allocations are
not at the same stage of the supply chain, they are still likely to share some
strategic characteristics.
Therefore, lines of business that have similar capital requirements may
also share other strategic similarities, which should lead to more successful
transference of skills, knowledge, and experience and more effective corporate-level management.

Hypothesis 2: Variance in capital intensity across the
lines of business of diversified firms will be inversely related to corporate financial performance.
METHODS
Data

Line-of-business data were extracted from the COMPUSTAT data base,

specifically the line-of-business segment, which includes information
the seven-year period 1984-90. Since this study focused on diversifie

firms, companies that were not active in more than one line of business w
excluded. Data for the performance and control variables were drawn from
the COMPUSTAT primary, secondary, tertiary, full, and research data base
All variables were averaged over the study period to minimize errors resul
ing from year-to-year volatility in the measures. Consequently, companies
that did not report complete data for at least four of the seven years for ea
of the variables were dropped from the study.1
Complete data were available for 96 firms. These firms participated
203 different four-digit and 55 different two-digit SIC industries. Althou
the study group is not particularly large, it compares well with the sizes o

1 A less restrictive inclusion criterion of three years of complete data for each variab

resulted in an increase to 133 firms and similar results for the tests of hypotheses. However,

less stable measures caused the model error terms to increase, which resulted in a drop
significance level for some of the models. For example, the significance level of the prim
R&D model dropped from p < .0001 to p < .001. Therefore, we had more confidence in
results using the more restrictive criterion.
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the samples used in other, widely cited diversification studies, including
Bettis (1981, N = 80), Bettis and Hall (1982, N = 80), Montgomery (1982, N
= 128), and Palepu (1985, N = 30).2 Furthermore, as Table 1 demonstrates,
the studied firms represent the distribution of industries in the entire line-

of-business data base fairly well. Studied companies averaged sales of $1.8
billion, assets of $1.8 billion, and 15,197 employees. Therefore, the results of
this study are not generalizable to small firms.
Variables

To examine Hypotheses 1 and 2, we used the variances of R&D intensi
and capital intensity across lines of business as measures of the differen

dispersion in resource allocations.3 The intensity variables were calcu

in the traditional manner, by dividing R&D expenditures and capital expe
ditures by sales.
Return on assets (ROA) was the measure of financial performance use
in this study. Although accounting-based measures of performance are n
without their faults, several researchers have recently defended them (B
miley, 1986; Jacobson, 1987; Long & Ravenscraft, 1984). Furthermore, sin
ROA is the most commonly used accounting-based measure of performan
in the strategic management literature, its use provides comparability w
many past studies of diversification. To control for industry influences,
used a weighted average of the ROA of the dominant four-digit industry
each firm, excluding the firm's own financial figures. The dependent va

able was an industry-adjusted measure in which industry ROA was s

tracted from firm ROA prior to analysis (Fowler & Schmidt, 1988; Rume
1982).

In addition to industry profitability, four other control variable
leverage, relative market share, firm growth, and diversification-w
added to the analysis. We considered leverage important because fir
sometimes accomplish diversification through acquisitions that are he

debt financed, and the correspondingly high interest payments can redu
profitability levels. We calculated leverage as the ratio of long-term debt
total assets. Another common measure of leverage, long-term debt to equ
was not as highly correlated with ROA and was therefore judged inferior

2 Most small or privately held companies are not required to file Securities and Exch
Commission 10-K reports detailing their line-of-business expenditures. Furthermore, o
companies that are required to file 10-Ks, most do not report R&D expenditures by lin
business. Standard & Poor's compiles information directly from 10-Ks and annual repor
exhaustive search of these source documents, which are reproduced on microfiche, would h
been prohibitively expensive and unlikely to produce a much larger data set. Consequent
concluded that any biases that may have resulted from use of the COMPUSTAT line-of-bus
segment data base were unavoidable (Palepu, 1985).
3 There was no theoretical reason to believe that variance was superior to other pote
measures of dispersion. Consequently, in pretests we substituted standard deviation an
measure that compared the highest to the lowest intensity and found comparable result
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TABLE 1

Two-Digit Industry Participation of Companies in the Study and in
COMPUSTAT Data Base
Lines of

Two-Digit
SIC Code

Description

Business

Percentage Percentage
of Sample of Data Base

Agriculture: Crops
Agriculture: Livestock
Metal mining

2

0.8

0.3

1

0.4

0.2

1

0.4

1.7

Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction
Building construction

1

0.4

0.6

8

3.1

4.9

1

0.4

1.2

Construction other than building
Construction: Special contractors

2

0.8

0.5

1

0.4

0.5

4

1.5

1.9

22

Food and kindred products
Textile mill products

2

0.8

0.8

25

Furniture and fixtures

1

0.4

0.7

27

3

1.1

1.4

6.9

4.8

39

Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum refining
Rubber and plastics
Leather and leather products
Stone, glass, concrete products
Primary metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical-electronic machinery
Transportation equipment
Measuring-controlling instruments
Miscellaneous manufacturing

42

Motor freight

1

0.4

0.8

45

Transportation by air
Transportation services
Electric, gas, and sanitation

1

0.4

0.5

1

0.4

0.4

1.1

3.3

01
02
10
12
13
15
16
17

20

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38

47

49

18
3

1.1

0.7

1

0.4

1.7

1

0.4

0.3

1

0.4

0.9

4

1.5

1.8

9

3.4

2.6

18

6.9

6.8

15

5.7

5.9

3.1

2.2

8

16

6.1

5.3

5

1.9

1.3

services

3
12

4.6

3.6

10

3.8

2.2

52

Wholesale: Durable goods
Wholesale: Nondurable goods
Retail: Building materials

4

1.5

3.8

53

Retail: General merchandise

12

4.6

0.8

50
51

54

Food stores

9

3.4

0.7

55

Auto dealers and service stations

1

0.4

0.3

56

Apparel-accessory stores

6

2.3

0.5

57

Furniture stores

1

0.4

0.5

2.3

1.3

58

Eating-drinking places

59

Miscellaneous retail

61
62

Credit agencies
Security-commodity brokers

63

Insurance

65

Real estate

67
70
72

Personal services

73

Business services

6

4.2

1.5

2

0.8

1.8

1

0.4

1.2

2

0.8

1.7

9

3.4

2.6

Investment offices

7

2.7

3.9

Hotels-lodging places

5

1.9

0.6

1

0.4

0.3

3.8

5.5

11

10
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Two-Digit Lines of Percentage Percentage
SIC Code Description Business of Sample of Data Base
75 Automobile repair services 1 0.4 0.3
76 Miscellaneous repair services 1 0.4 0.2
79 Amusement-recreation services 6 2.3 0.9

80
82
87

Health

services

Educational
Other

services

Market

variables

2

services

0.8
1

10

power

in

0.4

3.8

1.7
0.3
3.0

and

studies

grow

of

t

necessary to calculate a m
of a firm in a particular
competitor in that indust

this ratio across all of t
during the study period

firm sales across the per
Finally, we controlled fo

measures,

which

were

d

1975). We were interested
ables could explain a sig
presence of more traditio

included

three

compone

tion, and total diversification, which is the sum of unrelated and related

diversification. Palepu (1985) provides a detailed description of the compu-

tational methods involved.
Statistical Tests

Analysis of variance using SAS procedure GLM was used to test H
potheses 1 and 2 (SAS Institute, 1985). We first computed the models w
the variance measures and three of the control variables, excluding the
versification measures. Each of the three entropy measures was then adde
in turn. We then divided the data set into an early (1984-86) and a la
(1987-90) period to test the stability of the main effects across the ti
period under study. Only 83 firms were available for use in the early peri
tests because 13 of the 96 firms studied only reported adequate data f
1987-90. The full group of 96 firms was available for the late period te
All analyses were cross-sectional, with all the variables representing av
ages over the particular period under study (three to seven years, dependi
on the test).
Tests of the interactions between the variance scores and the entropy
measures were also conducted to examine the notion that the importance of
variance in resource allocations varied with the level of traditionally measured diversification within the firms. These tests did not add much to our
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understanding of the relationships being studied.4 Therefore, we do not
report the interaction test results herein.
RESULTS

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and

dent variables and their correlations. Since all the firms studied were diver-

sified, at least to the extent that they were involved in more than one line
business, the negative average industry-adjusted ROA (- 3.2%) suggests that
diversified firms, on the average, earn low returns (Chang & Thomas, 1989
However, the observed relationship between diversification and profitabilit

was not linear, since higher unrelated diversification was associated w

higher profitability. The negative relationship between related diversifica-

tion and profitability also suggests that a highly complex and somewh

surprising relationship exists between diversification and performance.
The values for related diversification appeared to be low relative to the

values for unrelated diversification. Unfortunately, Palepu (1985) did n

provide descriptive statistics on the firms he studied as a base for compar-

ison to our data. Consequently, we calculated the diversification measur

for all companies in the line-of-business data base over the seven years of th
study. We felt that this procedure offered a reasonable comparison because

Palepu also used this data base. The data base means (N = 6,970 compani

were .176 for unrelated diversification, .012 for related diversification, an

.188 for total diversification, compared to .600, .027, and .627 for the
firms in our study group. We concluded that the firms we studied we

significantly more diversified than the firms in the data base but that th
figures were reasonable given our selection criterion of involvement in mo
than one line of business; the data base includes many single-business com-

panies. Also, Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, and Harrison (1991) reported an

erage total diversification score of 1.628 for firms that were actively engag
in acquisitions.

The two variance measures were not significantly correlated, whic
could indicate that the measures assessed different things. Accordingl

lines of business that were outliers on one dimension might have fit withi
an overall corporate focus on the other. Furthermore, the only significant

relationship between the variance measures and the entropy measures
demonstrated by a coefficient of -.20 between the variance of R&D int

sity and unrelated diversification.
Four of the six control variables were significantly correlated with industry-adjusted ROA. Of particular interest was a negative and signific

correlation between industry-adjusted ROA and growth in sales. Furth
analysis revealed a very high mean and standard deviation for growth

sales, an indication that some of the firms studied were growing very fast

4 The only significant interaction effect was a negative interaction between the variance
capital intensity and related diversification for the complete seven-year period. However,
effect was not significant in either the early or late time period. Given the instability of
effect, we chose not to investigate it further.
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TABLE 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
Variables

Means

s.d.

1

2

3

4

1. Industry-adjusted ROA - 0.03 0.11
2. Variance of R&D

intensity 0.03 0.21 -.41***
3. Variance of capital

intensity 0.06 0.33 -.03 -.01

4. Growth in sales 0.84 3.58 -.27** .13 -.03

5. Leverage 0.22 0.17 -.13 .11 .01 .10

6. Relative market share 0.28 0.27 .27** -.16 .02 -.04 -.10

7. Unrelated diversification 0.60 0.31 .29** -.20* .17 -.22* -.03
8. Related diversification 0.03 0.09 -.32** .12 -.05 .03 9. Total diversification 0.63 0.32 .19 -.16 .15 -.21* -.06

a All values represent averages for the period
* p < .05
**p < .01

*** p < .001
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Such high rates of growth, whether through acquisitions or internal development, could have resulted in inefficiencies in some firms. In fact, some
firms may have been sacrificing profits for growth. Also observed were a

negative and significant relationship between related diversification and
performance and a positive and significant relationship between unrelated

diversification and performance.
Both the primary regression models, models 1 and 2, were found to be
highly significant in explaining firm performance (Table 3). The results of
model 1 support the existence of a negative relationship between the variance in R&D and industry-adjusted ROA, after growth in sales, leverage, and
relative market share are controlled. These results remained more or less

unchanged with each entropy measure introduced (models la-lc).
The analyses were also conducted with the control variables in the

absence of the R&D variance measure to assess the incremental R2 attribut-

able to the variance in R&D intensity. The incremental R2 was .114 (p < .001)
for the model with no entropy measures, .101 (p < .001) for the model with

the unrelated entropy measure included, .080 (p < .01) for the model with
the related entropy measure included, and .111 (p < .001) for the model that

included the total entropy measure. Consequently, we concluded that the
variance in R&D intensity across the lines of business of diversified firms
added a significant amount of explanatory power, even in the presence of the
control variables. These results offer strong support for Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between variance in capital intensity and performance. The results of the second regression model
failed to support any significant relationship between firm performance and
variance in capital intensity. Furthermore, these results did not change
when the entropy measures were added. Therefore, no support was found
for Hypothesis 2.
Table 4 gives the results of tests for the effects of period (1984-86 or
1987-90) on variance in R&D intensity. Not only are the results highly
significant in both periods, but the R2 values increased in six of the eight
models over values in the models' seven-year counterparts. The variance in
R&D intensity coefficients is much larger in the late period, an indication
that the R&D effect increased in importance. Overall, these results provide
further support for Hypothesis 1.5 It is also interesting to note that leverage,
5 We also conducted simple tests to examine causality. To test for forward causality, we
used variance in R&D intensity during the early period (1984-86) to predict later (1987-90)
performance (all the control variables were consistent in time frame with the performance
variable). We also used late-period variance in R&D to predict earlier performance, seeking
reverse causality. All the models were highly significant (p < .0001), which suggests some
degree of reciprocal causality-firms do it, it works, so they keep doing it. However, the highest
R2's were found in the tests of forward causality (.352 for the basic model, .368 for the model
with the unrelated diversification variable as a control, .425 for the model with related diver-

sification, and .355 in the model with total diversification). In fact, the individual significance
levels for the R&D variable increased to p < .0001 in all these models. Therefore, we concluded
that the predominant causal direction was forward.
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TABLE 3

Results of Regression Analysis for Industry-a
Industry-adjusted ROA

Independent Model Model Model Model Model Mo
Variables

Intercept

-.036

Variance of R&D intensity -.186***

1

-.060*

la

lb

-.026

Ic

-.039

2

-.042

2

-.076

-.177*** -.158** -.185***

Variance of capital
-.013

intensity
Growth in sales -.007*

Leverage - .031

- .006*

-.007*

-.008* -.0
-.049

-.034

-.060

-.031

Relative market share .082*

.066

.103

.080

Unrelated diversification

.046

Related diversification

.005

7.92***

df

6.72*** 10.05***

.259

.272

.358

4,91

5,90 5,90

6.27***

3.89**

.258

.146

5,90

4,91

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001
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-.0

.103* .0

-.395***

Total diversification
F

-.0

-.006*

TABLE 4

Results of Regression Analysis for Two Periods, R&

Industry-adjusted ROA, 1984-86 Industry-adju

Independent Model Model Model Model Model Mo
Variables

3

3a

3b

3c

4

4

Intercept -.021 -.031* -.018 -.017 -.010 -.0
Variance of R&D intensity -.033*** -.032*** -.033*** -.033*** -1,020*** Growth in sales -.003* -.003* -.003* -.003* -. -.008

Leverage -.074 - .073 - .084 - .075 -.136* - .137*
Relative

market

Unrelated
Related
Total
F

9.28***

R2

df

.322

.062

.056

.074*

diversification

.064

.018

8.22***

.325

5,77

7.34***

.348

5,77

.067

.06

-.137

diversification

7.41***

4,78

share

diversification

8.18***

-

-.

.

7.29***

.323

.265

.288

5,77

4,91

5,90

a The earlier-period models h
for only the last four years.
p < .05

**p < .01
***p < .001
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which was not significant in the seven-year tests, became important in the

tests of the late period, perhaps because of an increase in acquisitions by
these firms and the increasing use of junk bonds and high interest rates to

finance such acquisitions.
DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of the present study was to relate differ

emphases given to two strategic resources across diversified

lines of business to overall corporate performance. Results offer
for the idea that consistency across businesses in the emphasis g
is positively associated with corporate performance. However, th
support for a similar conclusion with regard to capital intensity

the results were mixed.

In spite of these mixed results, this study makes an important contribution to diversification research. In the traditional approach to diversifica

tion, firms appear to be little more than repositories for the producti

functions mandated by their lines of business. Accordingly, researchers can
assess synergy without regard for intraorganizational structures and pr

cesses, by using straightforward processes like comparing SIC codes. W

argued previously that one weakness of this approach is that it overemphasizes strategy formulation and virtually ignores strategy implementation.

In contrast, in the approach used, we treated each firm as a uniqu
configuration of resources with the potential for achieving a sustainab

competitive advantage. Accordingly, synergy can be assessed by penetrating

a firm to evaluate the level of consistency arising from processes such

resource allocation. This type of consistency may result from, among other
things, firm involvement in industries that have traditionally been though
to be related, but it is not limited to traditional product-market-indust
boundaries. Furthermore, this more subtle measurement approach taps both

implementation and execution.

The theory developed herein suggests that firms that maintain a consis
tent R&D strategy across lines of business may be trying to develop a corpo

rate distinctive competence that, according to Hitt and Ireland (1985), c

facilitate effective management of interdependencies among multiple units
Consistency may also be a by-product of the dominant logic of an organization (Grant, 1988; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). For example, unit managers who

have become accustomed to a particular R&D emphasis in their business

strategies as they are rising through the ranks are likely to continue this R&
emphasis when they arrive at the corporate level or are transferred to oth

business units within a corporation.
Similarity or consistency across business segments with regard to R&D
intensity could also signal a potential to exploit synergies through econ
mies of scope or scale (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Rumelt, 1982; Teece, 1980
Resource sharing and skill transference should be easier because of similarities among the lines of business in their organizational systems (Burns
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Stalker, 1961), organizational cultures (Chatterjee et al., 1992), or businesslevel strategies (Fryxell, 1990; Scarpello et al., 1986).
The results contained herein were not consistent with the findings of
Harrison and his colleagues (1991), who discovered that differences, not
similarities, in resource allocations between acquiring and target firms led to

higher post-merger performance. However, as explained earlier, performance effects associated with the bidding process in acquisitions do not
necessarily apply to an established portfolio of diversified businesses. For
example, Barney (1988) suggested that acquiring firms receive above-normal

returns when private or uniquely valuable synergistic assets are involved.
Harrison and colleagues argued that "the possibility of uniquely valuable
synergy is more likely to occur under dissimilar resource allocations rather

than similar resource allocations (1991: 177)." Therefore, the development
of a uniquely valuable synergy associated with resource allocation differences may occur only with acquisitions, demonstrating that prescriptions
regarding acquisition behavior may not be generalizable to all diversified
firms. Method of diversification may be as important as type of diversification, at least in the short term. Inversely, this proposition would certainly
explain why theory concerning related diversification does not necessarily
hold for acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986; Elgers & Clark, 1980).
Although this study offers strong support for the notion that consistency

in R&D resource allocations across lines of business is positively related to

performance, there is no support for the accompanying argument regarding

capital intensity. A capital intensity-performance relationship might not
occur because, now more than ever, competition requires quick mobility, the
ability to enter or leave businesses rapidly as conditions change. Organizations making consistently high capital expenditures may reduce their strategic flexibility, since capital equipment is much less adaptable to new busi-

nesses than the knowledge and skills gained through R&D. Alternatively,
organizations that consistently allocate small amounts of capital to their
lines of business may find themselves uncompetitive because they lack necessary technologies.

Some of the relationships observed in the correlation matrix deserve
further explanation. For example, unrelated diversification exhibited a
strong positive relationship with performance, but a strong negative relationship was found between related diversification and performance. Furthermore, as indicated by the very small correlation between related diver-

sification and unrelated diversification (r = -.01), the firms studied here

did not demonstrate a pattern of pursuing related and unrelated diversification simultaneously. This fact aids interpretation of the independent effects
of related and unrelated diversification on performance.
On the surface, the positive effect of unrelated diversification on per-

formance was surprising. However, the firms studied here that had high
levels of unrelated diversification had low levels of variance in R&D inten-

sity (r = -.20, p < .05). Combining these results created a picture of
efficient unrelated diversification. That is, although some firms diversified
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in directions that were outside their traditional product, market, or techno-

logical boundaries, exhibiting traditional unrelated diversification, they
could still be efficient by diversifying into areas with similar R&D require-

ments or by consistently emphasizing or deemphasizing R&D within their
existing lines of business.
Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) recently demonstrated that during the
1980s, restructuring firms were predominantly organizations that originally

had intermediate levels of diversification. Furthermore, they found that
most of their restructuring firms were moving away from unrelated diversi-

fication. Consequently, the unrelated-diversified lines of businesses that
were left would likely have been those with the most positive performance

implications. Our findings suggest that higher performance would be expected if the remaining businesses shared a similar R&D emphasis.
The negative relationship between related diversification and performance was also somewhat surprising. However, related diversification was
not associated with a consistent pattern of R&D allocations across lines of
business. In fact, the coefficient representing this relationship, although not

significant (r = .12, p < .23), was in the opposite direction. This was an

important result because it demonstrated that participation in the same major industry group did not necessarily mean that two businesses shared other
strategic characteristics.
Also, we defined lines of business as related only if they were in dif-

ferent four-digit industries within the same two-digit major group (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). Given this classification system, many

related-diversified corporations were managing two or more related businesses as separate lines of business, as indicated by separate financial reporting. This form of organization may be inferior to combining related
operations into one line of business. In other words, the negative perfor-

mance effects might be associated with the way the related-diversified firms

were structured.

The Resource-based View of Diversified Firms

The findings reported herein lend some support to the viability of
resource-based approach to the study of diversity (Harrison et al., 1991
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). A key issue in determinin
whether a resource can generate profits is whether it is idiosyncratic (Bar-

ney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). From a transaction-cost-economic

perspective, the question is whether the advantages related-diversified firm
gain can be just as easily obtained by their competitors as they trade goods

and services in an open market (Teece, 1984; Williamson, 1975). If the

cannot, a market failure exists.
We suggest, as have many proponents of the resource-based view, that

related-diversified firms can create idiosyncratic advantages because som

of the resources they control, such as experience, are imperfectly indivisib
(Caves, 1982; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Also, a firm's resource configuration
may itself be idiosyncratic, in that competitors may not be aware of or abl
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to imitate the configuration, at least in the short term. In fact, the decision
makers of some firms may not even be aware that their resource configurations, which may have been prompted by their dominant logics, are provid-

ing profits (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Causal ambiguity exists when the
relationship between the resources a firm controls and the profits they create

are imperfectly understood (Barney, 1991). Nevertheless, the results contained herein offer evidence that certain resource configurations do lead to
higher profits, whether or not firm executives are fully aware of the reasons
for the phenomenon.

Suggestions for Future Research
Future research can overcome some of the weaknesses found in this

study. For example, in an effort to maintain an adequately sized study g

we limited the investigation to R&D and capital resources expendit

which are the only two variables strategically relevant to the theory d
oped here on which firms publicly and routinely report information b
of business. However, marketing and advertising expenditures are othe
resource allocations that may be important in the context of a resourc
theory. The use of other methods for gathering data, such as surveys,

lead to richer and more comprehensive measures of resource alloca
among lines of business. Surveys might also help overcome a major
ness of this study, which is its focus on large, publicly traded fir

question remains as to whether the results reported here are generaliz
small or privately held firms.

Also, the measures of resource configurations used in this stud
coarse grained. For example, even though we discovered a relations

tween variance in R&D intensity and performance, it may be more im

that organizations develop idiosyncratic R&D skills within each of

highly research-intensive lines of business. In so doing, they may be a
develop tacit skills that are difficult to imitate. In fact, the coarse-gra
nature of the measures may be another reason that we found no suppo
the capital intensity hypothesis. Future research could delve deeper in
specific manner in which resources are deployed as firms attempt to d

sustainable competitive advantages.

Another obvious extension of this research would include other indexes

of performance, such as measures based on stock values. However, one of t
key advantages of market measures is their assumption that the market a
sorbs all the strategically relevant information about a firm and adjusts t
stock price accordingly (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986). Unfortunately, the m
ket has sometimes been shown to be inaccurate in assessing the future val
of diversification strategies (Schleifer & Vishny, 1991). In the present stud

we would not have expected an accurate market assessment of the fut
performance of a corporation to be based on the consistency of the fir

allocations to R&D across its lines of business. In other words, causal ambi-

guity might have led to erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, it might be
interesting to see if the market, which represents the collective knowledge of
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analysts and investors, is able to detect the performance effects of R&D
consistency across lines of business.
In addition to these methodological variations on the present study,
more theoretical and empirical work is needed to clarify the relationships
that exist between resources, resource configurations, and profits. For example, behavioral and cognitive theory may shed light on the processes and

stimuli that lead to various levels and types of resource allocations. Also,

organization theory has the potential to explain the different types of structures and systems that are necessary to effectively manage business units
with various R&D orientations. In addition, transaction cost economics may

help explain the internal resource allocation processes that lead to various
resource configurations. Finally, industrial organization economics and
classical economics can provide important insights concerning the role of

industry in determining a firm's most desirable resource allocation profile.
CONCLUSIONS

Researchers have already recognized a firm's level of R&D in
an important determinant of strategic competitiveness (e.g., Fr
Hitt, Hoskisson, & Harrison, 1991). Also, according to Hoskisso
(1988), less diversified firms are more research-intensive, and the
higher returns for their investments in R&D. Our results complem
earlier findings on R&D by suggesting that consistency in the R&
of an organization across lines of business is also important to obt
organizational performance. However, the results contained her
consistent with the findings of Harrison and his colleagues (1
implies that theory regarding diversification may not be directly
able to acquisitions, and vice versa.

Merging the present results with previous findings on R&D sug
a consistently high emphasis on R&D across closely related lines of
can provide strategic advantages that are unavailable to diversified
do not display such consistency. Alternatively, firms that do not

R&D in one line of business should consistently maintain thi

across other lines of business, by, for instance, constraining diver
to industries in which high levels of R&D are not essential to s

The resource-based measurement approach used in this stu

found to be a viable method for uncovering one element of strate
tency within diversified firms. Other elements may be accessib
similar methods, supplemented with surveys and other data.
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